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THE CURSE OF HISTORY: GOOD BANK BRANDS





"What's in a name!" Juliet exclaimed to Romeo.3 Judges
deciding trademark cases have turned her exclamation into a
question that they have been asking ever since. An examination of
the roster of bank trademarks might lead one to respond, "Not
much." A dull, gray landscape is littered with First, Second ... nth
National Banks of This, That, and The Other Place, broken only
by such rare bursts of imagination as Wachovia, Shawmut, or
Fleet. It is a particularly forlorn scene for trademark lawyers,
whose first piece of advice is usually to choose a name that is
creatively arbitrary.
Much of this sameness has a historical explanation. When
banking was a purely local enterprise, being the First National
Bank of Somewhere was distinctive enough. As a matter of fact,
in the nineteenth century, the National Bank Act required banks
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to have such names. Moreover, state laws have long protected
banks against the use of "bank" and related terms by nonbanking
entities Finally, until 1982, it was not even clear whether and to
what extent trademark law applied to bank names.6
All this changed in the latter part of the twentieth century.
Tightly-regulated local banks with a headquarters and a couple of
branches metamorphosed into statewide, then nationwide, then
multinational corporations competing in the free-fire zone of the
global financial services market. Where a bank's name had
formerly been a taken-for-granted bit of local knowledge,
irrelevant to everyone outside a particular city or town, it quickly
became a major corporate asset, the subject of major investment
and fierce litigation. These developments have not been lost on
the courts. In 1990, the Fifth Circuit noted that "the deregulation
of the banking industry and the advent'of branch banking, in
conjunction with the current banking crisis, may have led to the
problem of competing banks with the same name,"7 while the
Third Circuit has more recently characterized bank trademark
litigation as "an outgrowth of aggressive and expansionist banking
flowing from the Congressional liberalization in recent years of
national banking laws."" In case after case, the courts tell stories of
4. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 26-27 (2d ed. 2004) (quoting BRAY
HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE: BANKS AND POLITICS IN THE CIVIL
WAR 345 (1970). An early requirement that national banks bear numbers in their
names and that "existing banks give up their original names and be designated by
numbers, as if bankers long and successfully in business were without sentiment and
would as soon bear a number as an older and honored name," clearly discouraged
many banks from the national charter. When the rule was eliminated, the popularity
of the national charter increased so that there were 469 national banks at the end of
1864. However, this historical artifact helps to account for the names of many banks.
. . such as Fifth Third Bank, which has its antecedents in the Third National Bank,
organized in 1863, and the Fifth National Bank, which received its name in 1888.
These two institutions merged in 1908 to become the Fifth Third National Bank of
Cincinnati. The bank is now a state chartered bank. Id.
5. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-127(e) (2005).
6. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHTY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 9.03[3] (1996).
7. Union Nat'l Bank of Tex., Laredo v. Union Nat'l Bank of Tex., Austin, 909
F.2d 839, 841 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1990).
8. Citizens Fin. Group, Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evans City, 383 F.3d 110,
112 (3d Cir. 2004).
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once-sleepy, small-town banks suddenly emerging as protagonists
in national or even global trademark wars.
In light of this background, it is not surprising that the
current state of bank trademark law is unsettled and unsatisfactory
to many of those who must live with it. Names chosen in the
distant past for reasons unrelated to modern trademark theory are
now forced to do radically different duty. As often as not, they do
not do it well. In other words, banks that have spent years
investing in their brands now find that they have little legal
standing as trademarks.
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to impose some
thematic order on this chaotic law. In Part II, we will give a brief
overview of trademark protection and infringement as those
concepts apply in the banking context. In Part III, we will identify
and comment on some of the major themes that have emerged in
the cases, including the meaning of "distinctiveness" in the
banking context, the standards for proving likelihood of confusion,
both direct and reverse, the nature of the banking market from the
trademark perspective, and the application of trademark law to
nontraditional banking services. In Part IV, we conclude with
some practical suggestions for those who must live with bank
trademark law in its present form.
II. OVERVIEW OF GENERAL TRADEMARK PRINCIPLES
A trademark is not "intellectual property" in the same
sense that a copyright or patent is: a pure, if limited, property
interest held by the proprietor. Instead, trademark theory
combines elements of both property and consumer protection.
Thus, trademark law pursues two goals: "(1) to protect consumers
against confusion and monopoly, and (2) to protect the investment
of producers in their trade names to which goodwill may have
accrued and which goodwill free-riders may attempt to
appropriate by using the first producer's mark, or one that is
deceptively similar."9
9. Union Nat'l Bank, 909 F.2d at 843-44.
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These dual objectives dictate that protection be limited to
marks "by which the goods [or services] of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods [or services] of others."10  (For
purposes of this article, trademarks, which relate to goods, and
service marks, which relate to services, can be viewed as identical
in all material respects.)" If a mark is not distinctive-that is, it
does not have the capacity to distinguish the source of goods or
services-then the public cannot be confused by multiple uses. If
Company A sells soap but simply calls it "soap," then the public
loses no valuable distinguishing information if Companies B, C,
and D refer to the same product as "soap." Likewise, unless
Company A's investment in its mark leads to a distinctive
association between source and product or service, then there is
nothing on which a competitor could be accused of free-riding.
Accordingly, the first and most important requirement for
trademark protection- and the one that proves most troublesome
in the banking context-is that the mark be distinctive. Courts
typically lay out marks along a continuum from least to most
distinctive. 2 At the weak extreme are generic marks that simply
name the category of goods or services; thus, "soap" would be a
generic mark for soap. Generic marks are inherently
unprotectable. Descriptive marks are somewhat stronger. As the
word suggests, they go beyond simply naming the product and
describe it, as in "pure soap." Descriptive marks are protectable
only on a showing of "secondary meaning," which requires
evidence that the mark has become associated with the source in
the minds of consumers. Surveys are often introduced for this
purpose.
At the stronger end of the continuum are suggestive marks
and arbitrary or fanciful marks, both of which categories are
deemed inherently distinctive. Suggestive marks ultimately
describe the product but only after an act of imagination on the
part of the consumer: for example, "Ivory Soap." Strongest of all
are arbitrary or fanciful marks, which are defined as having no
10. Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2000).
11. See § 1053 (service marks registrable and protectable to same extent as
trademarks).
12. See First Bank v. First Bank System, Inc., 84 F. 3d 1040, 1045 (8th Cir. 1996).
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descriptive relationship to the product or service. Such marks are
often made-up words. In the soap category, think of "Camay";
other examples would include some of the world's most powerful
trademarks, such as Nike, Kodak, and Apple. 3 Over the history of
American banking, the majority of marks have probably been
descriptive, including all of the First National Banks of
, and the [name of town] Savings Banks. Inherently
distinctive bank marks have been rare. "Wachovia," the name of
the original Moravian settlement in that bank's home region of
North Carolina, is suggestive to those who know their North
Carolina history, and arbitrary or fanciful to others.
14
A common law trademark can be acquired by use. A
mark can also be registered with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO), either after use15 or prospectively, if
"intended for use.' 16  In addition to lack of distinctiveness,
registration may be refused on a number of other grounds,
including, most importantly, that the proposed mark "so resembles
a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark
or trade name previously used in the United States by another and
not abandoned, as to be likely... to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake."" In appropriate circumstances, the PTO may grant
concurrent registrations on the same mark, with "conditions and
limitations as to the mode or place of use."' 8  Registration
proceedings sometimes fail to discover unregistered previous users
of an identical or similar mark; they generally retain rights in their
existing territories of use.
The substantive standards for protection under the
common law and the various state trademark statutes tend to be
very similar to those that apply to marks registered under the
Lanham Act. Federal registration, however, confers a number of
significant advantages. Registration constitutes prima facie
13. The "Apple" mark for computers illustrates the point that a mark can be
descriptive for one class of goods but arbitrary for another.
14. See, e.g., Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F. 2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (2000).
16. § 1051(b). Actual use is required to perfect the registration; it is possible, by
seeking extensions, to delay actual use for as long as thirty-six months. § 1051(d).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2000).
18. Id.; see Application of Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466,469 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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evidence of the validity of the mark and the registrant's exclusive
right to use it.19 In addition, whereas a common law mark is
enforceable only in the area of actual use, registration constitutes
constructive nationwide use of the mark and provides constructive
notice of the registrant's claim to the mark.20 Taken together,
these provisions mean (1) that no subsequent (or "junior") user
can claim any rights in the mark anywhere in the country based on
use commenced after the first (or "senior") user's registration, and
(2) that any unregistered senior user will be limited to the territory
it occupied at the time of the junior user's registration.2' Finally,
after five years of use without successful opposition, a registered
mark acquires qualified "incontestability," meaning that the
registrant's right to use the mark can be challenged only on the
basis that it infringes upon a mark in use prior to the registration,
has become generic, has been abandoned, or is no longer under
the control of the registrant.22
Federal infringement actions typically proceed on two
complementary theories. The basic definition of "infringement" is
to "use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the
sale ... of any goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive., 23 In addition, the Lanham Act's unfair competition
provision, section 43(a), imposes liability on:
any person who, on or in connection with any goods
or services . . . uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which-
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2000).
20. 8H 1057(c), 1072.
21. See infra Part III (discussing these principles at length).




(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person, or
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services or commercial activities by
24another person.
Logically, any act of direct trademark infringement will
also violate section 43(a), so it is the usual vehicle for asserting
common law infringement claims based on unregistered marks.
Section 43(a) also reaches false advertising and a number of other
acts of unfair competition. Successful trademark infringement
actions typically lead to injunctive relief.25 Courts, however, are
authorized, "subject to the principles of equity," to award "(1)
defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and
(3) the costs of the action., 26 The court may triple the amount of
the plaintiff's actual damages "according to the circumstances of
the case.,27 In practice, however, "an injunction is the preferred
Lanham Act remedy," and awards of trademark damages are
28rare.
The operation of these basic principles in the banking
context is well illustrated by a recent federal case involving
Kentucky banks, Winchester Federal Savings Bank v. Winchester
29Bank, Inc. Plaintiff (WFSB), a savings and loan, opened in 1934
as Winchester Federal Savings and Loan Association. At that
time, its competition included The Winchester Bank, an entity
unrelated to the defendant, and Winchester Building and Savings
Association. The three institutions' names and financial structures
changed on several occasions; the plaintiff adopted its present
name in 1988, and both of the other "Winchester" banks had
dropped "Winchester" from their names by the 1990s. The





28. Minn. Pet Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 41 F.3d 1242, 1247-48
(8th Cir. 1994).
29. 359 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E. D. Ky. 2004).
2007]
NORTH CAROLINA BANK[NG INSTITUTE
early 2003. In an illustration of the banking industry's historically
cavalier approach to trademarks, at the time of the lawsuit,
WFSB's corporate parent, WinFirst Financial Corp., had
registered "Winchester" and "Winchester Federal Savings Bank"
with the State of Kentucky, but had yet to complete its federal
registrations. For that reason, the complaint alleged only federal
unfair competition in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
common law unfair competition, and state trademark
infringement.
The court began with the question of "whether the marks
are protectable."3 ° The parties agreed that both state and common
law protection should attach to the complete name, "Winchester
Federal Savings Bank." The stand-alone mark "Winchester" was
held to be geographically descriptive and a showing of secondary
meaning was therefore required.31 Following Supreme Court
precedent,32 the district court looked at seven factors: (1) direct
consumer testimony; (2) consumer surveys; (3) exclusivity, length
and manner of use; (4) amount and manner of advertising; (5)
amount of sales and number of customers; (6) established place in
the market; and (7) proof of intentional copying.33 The court
placed little reliance on limited direct consumer testimony (the
first factor) and found no evidence of direct copying (the seventh
factor). A consumer survey showing that "approximately 35% of
the respondents identified WFSB in connection with the word
'Winchester' as a bank in [the relevant county]," favored the
plaintiff, as did the plaintiff's continuous use of the word
"Winchester" since 1934 and the exclusive use of it since 1990;
WFSB's modest, but effective, advertising; its large loan portfolio;
and its long-established place in the market.34
Having found secondary meaning, the court moved to
likelihood of confusion. The various circuits employ roughly
similar multi-factor analyses; the Sixth Circuit's involves a
balancing of (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the similarity of the
30. Id. at 564.
31. Id. at 565.
32. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
33. Winchester Federal Savings Bank, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 565.
34. Id. at 566-67.
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competing marks; (3) the relatedness of the plaintiffs' and
defendants' goods or services; (4) evidence of actual confusion;
(5)the marketing channels used by the parties; (6) the likely degree
of purchaser care; (7) the intent of the junior party in selecting the
mark; and (8) the likelihood of the parties' expansion of their
product lines.35
The Winchester Federal court concluded the evidence of
likelihood of confusion was so strong as to support summary
judgment for plaintiff WFSB. With respect to strength, despite the
geographically descriptive nature of "Winchester," the plaintiffs'
continuous, exclusive, and well-advertised use of the mark made it
"strong in the local market. 3 6 The similarity of the parties' names
was very high, given that the word "Winchester" was the
predominant feature of both banks' names. Although the parties'
logos (also in dispute) were easily distinguishable from each other
when viewed together, the relevant legal test requires that they be
viewed separately. "When viewed alone, each logo's emphasis on
the word Winchester creates the potential that consumer with a
general understanding of the WFSB mark could confuse the two
logos and believe that the services offered by the defendant are
related to those offered by the plaintiff."37 With respect to the
third factor - the relatedness of the plaintiff's and defendant's
services- the court held that the parties' banking services were
nearly identical. Significantly, it found that "although traditionally
a number of distinctions existed between the services offered by
commercial banks and those of savings and loan associations,
those distinctions have all but disappeared."'3 8
The court then described actual confusion (the fourth
factor) as "the best evidence."39  It gave strong weight to
anecdotes about telephone calls intended for the defendant but
received by WFSB, misdirected mail and deliveries, customers
coming to the wrong bank, deposits and payments made out to the
wrong bank, and a single inquiry about whether the parties were
35. Frisch's Rest., Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642,648 (6th Cir. 1982).
36. Winchester Federal Savings Bank, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 568.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 569.
39. Id.
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the same bank. (The practical lesson here is that a prospective
trademark plaintiff can do itself a great deal of good by keeping
track of such incidents.) Finally, despite the fact that most of the
plaintiff's customers were individuals and most of the defendant's
were commercial enterprises, the court found significant overlap
in the parties' respective marketing channels, including billboards,
local newspapers, and local event sponsorship. There was no
useful evidence of purchaser care or the defendant's intent, and
likelihood of expansion was irrelevant because the parties already
occupied the same market.
Winchester Federal is especially effective in highlighting
several significant and recurrent issues in bank trademark disputes.
First, since so few bank trademarks are inherently distinctive,
secondary meaning is likely to be critical. Consequently, both
sides are likely to require consumer surveys. In addition, the
history of investment in the mark, especially through advertising, is
likely to take on great importance. If a case proceeds to the
likelihood of confusion phase, the same evidence of goodwill-
creation will once again be relevant. The comparison of the
competing marks will be done on a holistic, common-sense basis,
so those who are thinking of adopting a mark that looks or sounds
like an existing one should not place great reliance on technical
differences. In addition, a court may well say that "banking is
banking," and may well ignore differences in customer base that
may seem highly material from a business perspective. Finally,
and critically, a prospective trademark plaintiff can greatly help its
cause by keeping a record of all incidents of actual confusion,
however trivial they might seem in isolation.
III. SPECIAL ISSUES IN BANK TRADEMARK CASES
A. The Problem of Inherently Weak Marks
As we have already noted, the history of banking has made
the predominance of descriptive, inherently nondistinctive marks
almost inevitable. As several cases have demonstrated, however,




That point is amply demonstrated by Sun Banks of Florida,
Inc. v. Sun Federal Savings and Loan Association.4 ° Plaintiff Sun
Banks was a multi-bank Florida holding company that began using
the "Sun Banks" name in 1974 and registered it as a service mark
in 1977. Defendant Sun Federal did business in Tallahassee under
a different name until 1975; it then opened a branch near Sarasota,
changed its name to Sun Federal Savings and Loan, and obtained
state-but not federal-registration for a logo that featured its
name. Both parties indicated intent to expand statewide.41 The
trial court found in favor of Sun Banks on its claims for trademark
infringement and common law unfair competition, permanently
enjoining Sun Federal from using the name "Sun" alone or in its
logo. The Fifth Circuit held that the trial court's finding of
likelihood of confusion was clearly erroneous and reversed.42
The most interesting element of the case is that both banks
began with geographically descriptive marks-First at Orlando for
the plaintiff, and Leon [County] Federal Savings and Loan
Association for the defendant. Then, as both contemplated
expansion, each looked for "a less parochial name" that would also
have stronger trademark value.43  At one level, both of them
succeeded. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that the
name "Sun," although evocative of Florida, was "too broad to be
geographically descriptive."44 Indeed, the district court
characterized "Sun" as arbitrary, a finding that the Fifth Circuit
did not disturb.45 The problem, however, was that a lot of other
people had the same idea: "In 1976, over 4400 businesses
registered with the Florida Secretary of State used the word 'Sun'
in their names," and a significant number of them fell within the
category designated "financial institutions., 46 The significance of
this extensive third-party use was that it rendered a nominally
arbitrary trademark unenforceable. The Fifth Circuit
acknowledged that "Sun" had no descriptive or even suggestive
40. 651 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1981).
41. Id. at 313-14.
42. Id. at 313.
43. Id. at 314.
44. Id. at 317.
45. Sun Banks of Florida, 651 F.2d at 315.
46. Id. at 316.
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value with respect to banking services. Nonetheless, it concluded,
the ubiquity of this arbitrary term precluded the possibility of
confusion between these two parties. In other words, even a facially
arbitrary mark can lose its capacity to distinguish one company's
services from another's if it has come into near-universal usage.
Moreover, in the case of such a weakened mark, "minor additions
may effectively negate any confusing similarity," meaning that
such details as "banks" versus "federal savings and loan
associations," as well as differences in logo design, may be legally
sufficient to preclude confusion and avoid infringement.47
Finding as a matter of law that a trademark is
simultaneously arbitrary and unprotectable has a certain illogic to
it. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit's conclusion is defensible on a
number of grounds. The court might have analogized to
"genericide," whereby an originally arbitrary name for something
is captured by the everyday language: cellophane, aspirin, and
trampoline are well-known examples.48  Here, "Sun" had not
become a generic term for anything but, rather, a trade name for
almost everything. It might also be said that any "Sun" mark
plaintiff had been guilty of a kind of abandonment, suffering the
proliferation of its mark. Just as in the usual case of abandonment,
the mark's owner stood by while circumstances eroded its
distinctiveness. 49 And finally, there is the court's chosen logic: that
if a mark becomes so widely used that everyone is confused, no
one user can complain of the particular confusion caused by any
other user. The original instinct to avoid the "parochial" and thus
descriptive was sound, but the chosen solution was fatally flawed.
So-called "affinity cards" provide another example of a
failed attempt to escape the legacy of descriptiveness. Affinity
cards are credit cards that target geographic areas or various sorts
of interest groups, such as alumni of particular universities or
members of organizations. In re MBNA America Bank, N.A.5°
47. Id. at 316.
48. See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co.v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 321 F. 2d 577
(2d Cir. 1963) (holding that "thermos" had become a generic term for "vacuum
insulated container").
49. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED
STATE DOCrRINES 238-40 (rev. 5" ed. 2004).
50. 340 F. 3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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involved MBNA's efforts to register the marks "MONTANA
SERIES" and "PHILADELPHIA CARD" for geographically-
targeted affinity credit cards.
In support of the applications, the bank argued that the
marks were "not merely descriptive, but suggestive or arbitrary,
because they do not immediately convey information concerning
MBNA's credit card services."5 The marks, in other words, had
no more relation to credit card services than the word "Nike" does
to athletic shoes, and were thus inherently distinctive. Both the
PTO and the Federal Circuit disagreed, however. In their view,
the relevant business was not "credit card services" but "affinity
credit card services."52 This particular business consists of
"providing both credit card services and a feeling of social pride or
connection through the particular affinity card with words and
images identifying a particular city or state. 5 3  In a striking
instance of being hoist by one's own petard, the court quoted
MBNA's ad for its "TEXAS SERIES" cards, which depicted
credit cards with Texas scenes and contained the text "Celebrate
your pride in Texas with the Texas Series credit cards and a special
low rate! 5 4 Having thus redefined the relevant service, the court
agreed with the PTO that the marks applied for were "merely
descriptive of a significant feature or characteristic of the affinity
card services, i.e., feeling of pride in identification with a specific
regional location," and affirmed the PTO's rejection of the mark.55
It is difficult to see what MBNA could have done to bring
about a different result. Its application originally sought coverage
for "credit card services," which it amended to "credit card
services featuring credit cards depicting scenes or subject matter
of, or relating to," Montana and Philadelphia only at the insistence
of the PTO's Examining Attorney. 6 Moreover, as a dissenting
51. Id. at 1333.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. In re MBNA America Bank 340 F. 3d at 1334. The rejection was based on 15
U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), which prohibits the registration of "merely descriptive" marks,
although the PTO also made reference to 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2), which prohibits
geographically descriptive marks.
56. Id. at 1333.
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opinion pointed out, the bank repeatedly argued that it was
seeking to register its marks for credit card services, not cards with
particular geographic affiliations." By its formulation of the
relevant business, the court thus seems to have erected a virtual
per se rule against the registration of affinity card marks that name
the targeted group. This rule is of particular importance because
the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from
P~o . . 58PTO decisions.
B. Proving Secondary Meaning
Two cases illustrate the difficulties that almost always
ensue when a bank tries to prove that an inherently weak
descriptive mark has acquired secondary meaning. Both
emphasize the difference between attempting to impart secondary
meaning and successfully doing so, while the second also discusses
the role of survey evidence. In First Bank v. First Bank System,
Inc.,59 plaintiff First Bank (FB) made an unsuccessful effort to
enjoin defendant First Bank System (FBS) from using First Bank
or any colorable imitation in FB's primary market area in Iowa.
From 1938 to 1993, FB was a federally chartered bank known as
First National Bank of West Des Moines; it became an Iowa state-
chartered bank in 1993, its business still limited to the Des Moines
area. Defendant FBS is a multi-state bank holding company
headquartered in Minneapolis. It entered the Iowa market in the
1970s by providing mail-order banking services, and then acquired
several Iowa branches in 1994, the names of which it changed to
First Bank Iowa.
FB never attempted to register a mark, while FBS obtained
Iowa registration of "First Bank" in 1968, and a series of federal
registrations beginning in 1971. FB was thus relegated to asserting
a common law service mark, which would be subject to the same
standards of validity as a registered mark. Because FBS's
57. Id. at 1337.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (2000). Alternatively, a party aggrieved by a PTO
decision may challenge it by filing a civil action in a United States district court.
§ 1071(b). Civil trademark actions in the district courts are appealable to the
geographic circuits. § 1121(a).
59. First Bank v. First Bank System, Inc., 84 F.3d 1040 (8th Cir. 1996).
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registrations constituted constructive nationwide use of the mark,
FB could claim a right of priority only in the area where it actually
used the mark prior to FBS's registration.6
Because FB conceded that "First Bank" was descriptive
and thus not inherently distinctive, it had to prove that the mark
had acquired secondary meaning. Toward that end, FB offered
the testimony of its chairman, two advertising agents, and an
advertising expert that as early as 1969, it had undertaken a
campaign "to establish the concept of 'First Bank"' as a substitute
for its original name of "First National Bank." The stated purpose
of this initiative was to head off FBS's incursion into its market.
FB's efforts included adopting a new logo that emphasized the
words "First" and "Bank," printing the logo on various items, and
answering the phone "First Bank." However, aside from the
"impression" of one of the advertising agents, there was no
evidence that these efforts worked in the marketplace; in the
court's judgment, FB failed "to establish sufficient proof that
consumers identified First Bank with the services provided by
FB. ' '61 On the contrary, FB's own expert admitted that this had
not happened by the mid-1980s.62
The case makes the important point that in establishing
secondary meaning, effects are more important than efforts. That
is, there must be evidence that the secondary meaning has taken
hold in the minds of consumers. In addition, the case provides yet
another reminder of just how casual banks have been in the
treatment of their trademarks. When such careless trademark
proprietors appear as plaintiffs, it is extremely difficult for them to
persuade the courts to take seriously marks that they themselves
have all but ignored.
In the second case, Bank of Texas v. Commerce Southwest,
Inc.,63 plaintiff Bank of Texas was a neighborhood bank in
northeast Dallas that had done business under that name since
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2000).
61. First Bank, 84 F.3d at 1045.
62. Id. at 1043. It is also significant that as late as 1985, one of the advertising
agents was still urging a formal name change and a trademark lawyer-who referred
to his client as "First National" in his correspondence-was pointing out a possible
conflict with FBS if the name change were made. Id.
63. 741 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1984).
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1973. It sued under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (because-
surprise! -its mark was unregistered) after a bank holding
company named Commerce decided to rename its Dallas County
banks "BancTEXAS." The jury found that "Bank of Texas" had
acquired secondary meaning within the plaintiff's trade area of
Dallas County, and that "BancTEXAS" would be likely to confuse
consumers. The district judge entered judgment notwithstanding
the verdict in favor of the defendant on the ground that the
plaintiff had failed to establish secondary meaning for its mark,
and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.64
The Fifth Circuit found that the mark "Bank of Texas" was
geographically descriptive, and thus required a showing of
secondary meaning to establish distinctiveness. It described the
plaintiff's burden as showing "that the primary significance of the
term in the mind of the consuming public is not the product, but
the producer., 65 Bank of Texas emphasized its nine years of
exclusive use of the mark before the defendant's name change, as
well as the money it expended on advertising to promote its name.
Like the court in the First Bank case, however, the Fifth Circuit
focused on effects rather than effort: "[I]t is not the amount of
money spent on advertising that is important, but the results
achieved with the money spent." 66 Bank of Texas also pointed to
instances of actual confusion in which wire transfers were sent to
the wrong bank. However, it was personnel of other banks who
were confused, not the consumers who must be the target of the
secondary-meaning inquiry. Moreover, even this confusion was
limited to the short period of time immediately after Commerce's
name change. 67
Plaintiff Bank of Texas also offered a survey, a common
method of proving both secondary meaning and likelihood of
confusion in trademark cases. In a telephone survey of people
who had numbers in the exchanges surrounding Bank of Texas,
58.7% of respondents said that they had heard of Bank of Texas;
the plaintiff argued that this name recognition was evidence of
64. Id. at 786.
65. Id. at 787.
66. Id. at 788.
67. Id. at 788-89.
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secondary meaning. The court emphasized that since Bank of
Texas "sought to enjoin the use of the name BancTEXAS in all of
Dallas County, which is the area appellant claimed as its trade
area," it had the burden of proving secondary meaning throughout
the county.68 The survey, however, apparently covered only the
portion of the county surrounding the plaintiff's banking facility,
and the survey designer was forced to admit that the results could
not be assumed to be representative of the entire county.
Moreover, even if 58.7% of the respondents had heard of Bank of
Texas, only 11% could identify its location.
The case law on surveys is extensive and inconsistent.69
One can infer a few general principles but no bright-line rules. In
another context, a court might well have relied on a survey just
like this one. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the
longstanding suspicion of weak and poorly-policed bank
trademarks conditioned the Fifth Circuit to find that the glass was
half-empty in this situation.
C. Proving Likelihood of Confusion
A "First National" case illustrates the difficulty of proving
likelihood of confusion, even when an inherently weak mark has
been supported by a showing of secondary meaning. In First
National Bank, in Sioux Falls v. First National Bank, South
Dakota,7 ° the plaintiff (SF) had operated as a national bank in
Sioux Falls since 1885, adopting its present name in 1952 and using
it continually except for a period between 1976 and 1985. No
other Sioux Falls bank had used any variation on "First National"
since 1929. The defendant (SD), located ninety miles away in
Yankton, South Dakota, operated as a state bank with a different
name until 1994, when it converted to a national bank with its
present name. When SD applied to the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency in 1995 to open a branch in Sioux Falls under the
68. Id. at 789.
69. See generally Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2000) (providing an excellent
introduction to survey research for litigation); see supra notes 63-65 and
accompanying text (providing further development of the survey issue).
70. 153 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 1998).
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name of First National Bank, South Dakota, Sioux Falls Branch,
SF sued to enjoin use of that name under the common law and the
Lanham Act." After a bench trial, the district court entered a very
limited injunction in favor of plaintiff SF (prohibiting SD from
using any version of the "First National" mark within a ten-mile
radius of SF's main office) and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
The otherwise successful plaintiff SF appealed from the
district court's single adverse finding: that the defendant's use of
its full name, First National Bank, South Dakota, and/or logo
would not create a likelihood of confusion, even within a ten-mile
radius. Applying the usual multi-factor analysis, the district court
found, and the Eighth Circuit agreed, that SF's marks were strong;
that the parties would be in close competitive proximity; that the
competing marks were very similar; that SD intended to target
SF's customers, even if it was not attempting to confuse them; and
that a newspaper advertisement placed by SD had caused actual
confusion. But both courts also found that because "consumers
tend to exercise a relatively high degree of care in selecting
banking services," they are more likely to be attentive to relatively
minor differences in names.72 Consequently, the Eighth Circuit
concluded (citing the Sun Banks case), there may be
"minimal or no likelihood of confusion even where the names of
financial institutions share the same dominant terms.,
73
The message could not be clearer: even when a showing of
secondary meaning is made, courts will find any available rationale
to limit the enforcement of traditional and common bank names.
Here, both courts found in favor of the plaintiff on five of six
likelihood of confusion factors. Nonetheless, defendant SD
emerged from the litigation with total freedom of trademark
action outside a ten-mile radius of SF's premises, and even within
that radius as long as it used its full name and/or logo.
71. Although the court did not specify, this was presumably a Lanham Act
section 43(a) suit, since the case makes no reference to any registrations.
72. First National Bank, 153 F.3d at 889.
73. Id. at 889-90 (citing First Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. First Bank System, Inc, 101
F.3d 645, 653 (10th Cir. 1996)).
[Vol. I11
BANK TRADEMARKS
D. Proving "Reverse Confusion"
First National Bank is a typical "direct confusion" case,
where the earlier, or senior, user of the mark attempts to prevent
the later, or junior, user from free-riding on the goodwill it has
created. This was precisely SF's allegation: that SD, a late-comer,
was threatening to capture the brand value that SF had established
in the various "First National" marks. Consumers, it was alleged
(albeit unsuccessfully), would be confused into thinking that SD
was really SF. As is typical in such cases, the senior user's mark
was strong and well-promoted in its geographic area, which would
support a facially credible charge of free-riding by the junior
entrant into the senior's market.
Banking practices in today's largely unregulated national
market may also give rise to claims of "reverse confusion," where
the junior user is substantially more powerful. Instead of trying to
take advantage of the senior user's name, the junior seeks to
obliterate it by "saturat[ing] the market with a similar
trademark. 7 4 Rather than being deceived into thinking that the
junior user's services are really those of the senior, "the public
comes to assume the senior user's products are really the junior
user's or that the former has become somehow connected to the
latter., 75 Thus overwhelmed, "the senior user loses the value of
the trademark-its product identity, corporate identity, control
over its goodwill and reputation, and ability to move into new
markets.,
76
Two recent Third Circuit cases illustrate the contours of the
"reverse confusion" theory and the difficulties likely to be
encountered in using it in the banking context. The more recent of
the two, Freedom Card, Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co, presented
a would-be David and Goliath story that is typical of the genre.77
A company called Urban Television Network (UTN) had begun
issuing a "Freedom Card" credit card in late 2000 to the
74. Freedom Card, Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 432 F.3d 463, 471 (3d Cir.
2005).
75. Id. at 471.
76. Id.
77. 432 F. 3d 463 (3d Cir. 2005).
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"subprime" credit market.78 The consumers in this market are
disproportionately African-American, so UTN contracted with
Queen Latifah to promote the card, which had very low credit
limits and very high interest rates and fees. UTN registered the
Freedom Card mark. UTN marketed the card for only a year, and
stopped taking new accounts at the end of 2001.
Meanwhile, Chase was developing a card that was tied to a
gas station rebate program.79 In January 2003, Chase announced
its "Chase Freedom" card in a Wall Street Journal ad. In contrast
to UTN's target audience, Chase's customers typically had
substantial incomes, high credit ratings, and owned their own
homes; Chase's cards had high credit limits and low interest and
fees. Upon seeing the ad, UTN's CEO objected; Chase suspended
its marketing efforts while the parties conducted unsuccessful
negotiations.8° In February 2003, Chase filed an action for a
declaratory judgment of non-infringment, and UTN
counterclaimed for trademark infringement and unfair
competition in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The
district court granted summary judgment for Chase upon finding
that there was no likelihood of confusion between the two marks
and the Third Circuit affirmed.
UTN had no basis for a traditional claim of direct
confusion, since it was clear that Chase was not trying to
misappropriate the goodwill that UTN had established in Freedom
Card. Instead, it relied on a theory of reverse confusion, alleging
that the more powerful junior user-Chase-was attempting to
obliterate its mark, with the result that consumers would come to
associate "Freedom Card" with Chase. The Third Circuit
acknowledged the validity of the theory in the abstract, observing
that "[w]ithout the recognition of reverse confusion, smaller senior
users [such as UTN] would have little protection against larger,
more powerful companies who want to use identical or confusingly
similar trademarks." 82  Such protection must be balanced,
7& Id. at 466.
79. Id. at 466-67.
80. Id. at 467.
81. Id. at 468, 482.
82. Freedom Card, 432 F.3d at 471.
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however, against the possibility that "innovative junior users, who
have invested heavily in promoting a particular mark, will
suddenly find their use of the mark blocked by plaintiffs who have
not invested in, or promoted, their own marks.,
83
The problem for UTN was at the factual level, as the two
courts found an absence of the effort to "overwhelm" a junior user
that is the hallmark of the reverse confusion theory. On the
contrary, when Chase announced its Freedom Card, UTN had
been out of the market for over a year. Moreover, Chase
supported its entry with a single ad-hardly "saturation" - and
desisted as soon as UTN complained. Nonetheless, the Third
Circuit went through the ten factors it has prescribed for analyzing
reverse confusion, which are nearly identical to those used in
direct confusion cases. 84 None offered any support to UTN's
position. On the contrary, on the similarity factor, Chase's
inclusion of its "housemark" (corporate name) on its Freedom
Card helped to persuade both courts that market confusion was
unlikely. Moreover, as in the Sun Banks and First National cases,
UTN was found to have undercut itself by making a showing in its
PTO registration proceeding of the widespread use of "freedom"
marks.
The earlier, more complex case of Citizens Financial
Group, Inc. v. Citizens National Bank of Evans City85 demonstrates
what is necessary for a victim of reverse confusion to prevail.
Citizens Financial Bank of Evans City (CNBEC) is a 16-branch
community bank in northwestern Pennsylvania that has used the
apparently unregistered "Citizens National Bank" and "Citizens"
marks since 1878. Citizens Financial Group (CFG) is subsidiary of
Royal Bank of Scotland that purchased the Pennsylvania retail
83. Id. at 472 n. 17.
84. Id. at 471, 473-74. The only differences relate to mark strength and "other
factors." With respect to the former, in a direct confusion case the court should look
at the strength of the plaintiff-senior owner's mark, whereas in a reverse case the
court should consider both "a commercially strong junior user's mark and a
conceptually strong senior user's mark in the senior user's favor." In the "other"
category, a direct case requires consideration of other factors that might suggest to
consumers that the senior plaintiff would be likely to enter the defendant's market; in
a reverse case, the question is whether consumers might expect the more powerful
junior user to offer both services or to expand into the plaintiff's market. Id.
85. 383 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 2004).
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operations of Mellon Bank in 2001 and renamed all the branches
"Citizens Bank," simultaneously registering that mark with the
PTO. Nine of the CFG branches were near CNBEC branches,
sometimes on the same street. When CNBEC sent it a cease and
desist letter, CFG sued for a declaratory judgment of non-
infringement, and CNBEC counterclaimed under Lanham § 43(a).
CNBEC advanced a theory of reverse confusion, alleging
that the "expansionist" larger bank was attempting to obliterate its
longstanding mark.& Its evidence showed that it had spent
millions of advertising dollars over the years in promoting
variations on the name "Citizens.""7 Since its acquisition of Mellon
in 2001, CFG had also invested heavily in promoting itself as
"Citizens" or "Citizens Bank." CNBEC employees claimed to
have recorded more than 2,000 instances of actual consumer
confusion, and CFG customers testified about their mistaken
efforts to transact CFG business at CNBEC branches.8 In
addition, CNBEC produced two university professors as experts.
The first opined about the likelihood of confusion given
consumers' tendency to shorten brand names in memory and
speech. The other presented a survey of consumers in the
Pittsburgh area that showed that "an overwhelming majority
shortened the bank's name and referred to Citizens Bank as
"Citizens." 89 CFG offered its own registrations as well as some
equivocal cross-examination testimony by CNBEC executives
about the strength of their marks.
In a special verdict, the jury found that CNBEC had used
"Citizens" as a mark, that the mark was suggestive, arbitrary, and
fanciful, and that there was a likelihood of confusion between
CFG's marks and CNBEC's "Citizens" mark. However, the jury
found no likelihood of confusion with CNBEC"S "Citizens
National Bank" mark, and no injury to CNBEC as a result of
CFG's infringement. The jury then informed the judge that it had
found a verdict "in favor of CFG." ° The district court found the
86. Id. at 112-13.
87. Id. at 114.
88. Id. at 115.
89. Id.
90. Citizens Financial Group, 383 F.3d at 117.
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individual elements of this verdict to be inconsistent and thus
undertook to "mold" them into a judgment.9 In a convoluted set
of findings, it ruled that CNBEC had not proved bad faith or
deliberate infringement; "that a full injunction directed to CFG
would have devastating effects on its business and customers," not
only in northwestern Pennsylvania but throughout the state;92 that
the public interest would be harmed by an injunction against CFG,
since even if it changed the name of its branches consumers would
still have to be told of the affiliation with Citizens Bank; and-talk
about blaming the victim-that CNBEC was guilty of "unclean
hands" because it had dropped the word "National" from its
advertisements after CFG had entered the market.93 Not only did
the court deny the injunction that CNBEC sought, it decided sua
sponte to issue a mandatory injunction requiring CNBEC to use
the word "National" on all its documents and in all its promotional
activities. It also entered the declaratory judgment requested by
CFG.
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed a number of trial
court rulings pertaining to evidence and jury instructions, but took
issue with the district court's perceived need to mold an
"inconsistent" verdict. On the contrary, the Third Circuit held,
"[t]aken together, these responses constituted a finding that CFG
had infringed on CNBEC's trademark" and "the jury's findings in
this case were not inconsistent, and no molding was necessary to
harmonize them., 94 In particular, the jury's finding that CNBEC
had suffered no "injury" should have been read as pertaining only
to money damages, since "trademark injury amounts to
irreparable injury as a matter of law." 95 With this reinterpretation,
the purported inconsistencies vanished.
In consequence of its rehabilitation of the jury's verdict, the
Third Circuit ordered the entry of a declaratory judgment in favor
of CNBEC. Turning to the injunction, it heavily criticized each of
the district court's subsidiary findings, especially its attribution of
91. Id. at 113.
92. Id. at 117.
93. Id. at 117-18.
94. Id. at 124.
95. Citizens Financial Group, 383 F.3d at 125 (citations and quotations omitted).
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unclean hands to CNBEC. Concluding that there could be "no
doubt of a strong likelihood of reverse confusion in this case,, 96 the
Third Circuit remanded for the framing of an injunction tailored to
protect CNBEC's mark within-but not beyond-its trade area
and to minimize the confusion to CFG's customers whose bank
would suddenly be renamed.
One of the evidentiary points on which the Third Circuit
affirmed the trial court is also worthy of mention. The trial court
excluded the testimony of one of CNBEC's survey experts on the
grounds that he surveyed the wrong "universe," or population, of
consumers. The expert had surveyed consumers both within and
beyond CNBEC's traditional market base, on the theory that "the
universe at issue consisted of potential customers of both parties." 97
Both courts disagreed: since reverse confusion is concerned with
obliteration of the smaller senior user's identity in the minds of its
customers, "the proper universe under CNBEC's theory of reverse
confusion was limited to CNBEC's customer base, not to CFG's
customer base., 98 In other words, since "the relevant issue is
whether consumers mistakenly believe that the senior user's
products actually originate with the junior user, it is appropriate to
survey the senior user's customers." 99
Several inferences emerge from a comparison of these
reverse confusion cases. First, the courts have a solid conceptual
understanding of the harm that larger companies can do when they
lay siege to the trademarks of established local businesses. But
they will require more than the mere ritual recitation of words like
"saturate" and "overwhelm." The senior local company must
prove that it has a distinctive mark, either inherently or through
secondary meaning, and that it has a history of taking steps to
enhance and protect its goodwill. Finally, there must be evidence
that the powerful junior is actually attacking that mark by offering
similar services in the same geographic market under a confusingly
similar name.
96. Id. at 131.
97. Id. at 119.
98. Id. at 120.




E. Defining Relevant Markets
In antitrust cases, courts have long had to define relevant
geographic and product markets. Similar concepts apply in
trademark cases, as likelihood of confusion usually requires a
showing that the parties are offering similar products or services
through similar channels of commerce in the same geographic
area. For most of the history of American banking, geography was
non-controversial, as banks were limited by law to counties or
other circumscribed local markets. Product markets were similarly
easy to define, as banks offered essentially the same services, at
least within the broad categories of "commercial" and "savings"
banks.'0° Now, however, banking has suddenly come to look like
other industries, with constantly changing "product" lines and no
geographic limits.
Several of the cases already discussed have dealt with the
two elements of market definition. With respect to geography,
First National Bank emphasized that the holder of an unregistered
common law trademark will be able to enforce it only in the area
where it actually does business, however limited that may be.'0 '
The Citizens case also analyzed the relationship between
registered and unregistered marks in the context of geographic
expansion, this time in the reverse confusion context.0 2 The Third
Circuit found that the equities lay almost entirely on the side of
CNBEC, the smaller, senior user of the Citizens mark. But
nonetheless, because CNBEC was also an unregistered user of that
mark, it was entitled to injunctive relief against its expansionist
junior rival only in the geographic area where it had actually been
doing business-a single county. In both cases, the cost of failing
to register was high.
100. Cf United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (holding
that the "cluster of products (various kinds of credit) and services (such as checking
accounts and trust administration) denoted by the term 'commercial banking,'
composes a distinct line of commerce for product market]"); United States v.
Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974) (declining to include savings banks
in the product market although noting that "[a]t some state in the development of
savings banks it will be unrealistic to distinguish them from commercial banks for
purposes of the Clayton Act").
101. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
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The MBNA and Freedom Card cases, which dealt,
respectively, with affinity cards and subprime credit cards,
illustrate emerging problems of product market definition in the
contemporary banking industry. In MBNA, both the PTO and the
Federal Circuit held that affinity cards comprise a discrete service,
which led to the conclusion that a mark that names or describes
the target affinity group lacks inherent distinctiveness. 3 In
Freedom Card, the court's conclusion that there was no likelihood
of confusion rested in significant part on the finding that there was
little overlap between the customers for one issuer's low-credit-
limit, high-fee card and the other's high-limit, no-fee offering.' °4 In
both cases, the message is that banking is no longer a monolithic
industry. Rather, it is a multi-faceted, rapidly evolving business
whose product and customer markets may have complex
trademark implications.
Two earlier cases reflect further variations on this theme.
In Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A.,105 Wells Fargo (actually, its predecessor, Crocker National
Bank) successfully opposed CIBC's (it is referred to commonly
and on its website as CIBC - not Canadian) attempt to register
COMMCASH as a service mark for "banking services." The PTO
and the Federal Circuit agreed that the CIBC mark was likely to
cause confusion with the COMMUNICASH mark that Crocker
had previously used and registered, also for "banking services.
1 6
The key issue was the meaning and significance of the term
"banking services," which both parties had designated as their
category of use in their respective registration applications.
At the time of the controversy, both parties used their
marks "only in connection with the highly specialized service of
electronic cash management," which at that time was "used solely
by large corporations and banks."'07  CIBC argued that the
"discerning and sophisticated" nature of such customers and the
high degree of care they exercised in purchasing these services
103. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
105. 811 F.2d 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
106. Id. at 1491-92.
107. Id. at 1491.
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precluded a finding of possibility of confusion between the two
marks.' °8 The problem with this position, both the PTO and the
court found, was that the relevant market could not be so limited.
On the contrary, the likelihood of confusion must be resolved not
on the basis of a registration applicant's current use of the mark,
but "on consideration of the goods [or services] named in the
application." Moreover, the PTO and the courts must bear in
mind that "although a registrant's current business practices may
be quite narrow, they may change at any time from, for example,
industrial sales to individual consumer sales."1 °9 Because both
Crocker's earlier registration and CIBC's disputed application
claimed the unlimited general category of "banking services," the
likelihood of confusion had to be assessed in that broader and far
less sophisticated consumer market.
It is interesting that in both MBNA and Canadian Imperial
the applicants were denied registration because of the implications
of their designation of the relevant services market, even though
the two applicants took opposite approaches. MBNA was denied
because its narrow definition ("affinity credit card services") led to
its marks being found to be merely descriptive. CIBC lost because
its definition was too broad, prompting the inference that the
consumers of undifferentiated "banking services" were likely to be
confused. This "heads I win, tails you lose" situation is yet another
indication of the problems that banks have long faced and
continue to encounter in protecting their trademarks.
A final case, Union National Bank of Texas, Laredo v.
Union National Bank of Texas, Austin,"0 further illustrates the
geographic complexities that can result from the interaction of
registered and unregistered bank marks. Plaintiff UNB-Laredo
had been doing business under its present name in Laredo since
1987, and in San Antonio since 1988. Its marks were unregistered.
Defendant UNB-Austin was a subsidiary of an Arkansas holding
company that had done business in Arkansas and Oklahoma for
many years prior to the establishment of UNB-Laredo; all of its
banks were named "Union National Bank of [geographic
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1492.
110. 909 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1990).
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designation]," which was registered as a federal mark. UNB-
Austin's parent entered the Texas market for the first time in 1988
when it acquired the assets of a failed Texas institution and opened
for business in Austin as "Union National Bank of Texas,
Austin.' 11
After UNB-Austin opened, UNB-Laredo demanded that it
cease and desist from using its chosen name. In response, UNB-
Austin changed its name to "Union National Bank, Austin,
Texas." UNB-Laredo rejected this compromise and filed suit
under Lanham section 43(a) and the common law, seeking to
enjoin UNB-Austin from using either "Union National Bank" or
Union National Bank of Texas." The district court interrupted the
testimony of UNB-Laredo's first witness and held as a matter of
law that "Union National Bank" was descriptive and thus required
proof of secondary meaning. When UNB-Laredo stipulated that it
could not prove secondary meaning in the Austin market, the
district court reasoned that there was nothing left to try and
entered judgment for UNB-Austin."2
The Fifth Circuit reversed on the straightforward ground
that "the categorization of a term is properly considered a matter
of fact," not law;"3 it remanded the case to give UNB-Laredo a
chance to present evidence on the alleged distinctiveness of its
mark. In the course of its instructions to the district court, it
reviewed some of the significant principles pertaining to
geographic conflicts between trademarks. A preliminary but
critical issue in this case would necessarily be which of the two
parties was the senior user. That in turn would raise the question,
"What is the 'market' for purposes of determining who is the
'senior user'?" 114 Although the Fifth Circuit ultimately left that
issue for the district court on remand, it did ruminate on the
possibilities at some length:
111. Id. at 841.
112. Id. at 842.
113. Id. at 846. There is no record of what happened to the case after the remand
order.
114. Id. at 843 n.9.
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For example, UNB-Austin is the senior user if we
define the market as being the nation, or even the
South or Southwest. On the other hand, if we
define the "market" as limited by state boundaries,
then UNB-Austin is the senior user in Oklahoma
and Arkansas, but UNB-Laredo is the senior user in
Texas. But there is no particular reason to define
"the market" on the basis of national or state
boundaries if it does not conform to the commercial
reality.115
The related determinations of market and seniority could
have great practical impact in a convoluted factual context such as
this one. Generally, a senior user can exclude junior users "in the
market it actually serves plus its 'natural zone of expansion.",
116
Outside of that market-plus-zone-of-expansion, there will be no
likelihood of confusion, and thus no basis for an injunction. When
the senior user has registered its mark, it obtains constructive
nationwide use, "conferring a right of priority," as of the date of its
application, '17 as well as constructive notice to all as of the date of• . 118
registration. These provisions mean that a registered senior user
should be able to enjoin any junior user, anywhere in the country:
senior's "market" is, by operation of law, nationwide, and
everyone coming along later is presumed to know that.
Nonetheless, there is old, much-disputed, but still-cited case law to
the effect that even a registered senior user will not be entitled to
an injunction outside of its actual market-plus-zone-of-
expansion. 19
An unregistered senior user is not entitled to these
constructive benefits, and acquires the common-law rights to use
115. Id.
116. Union Nat'l Bank of Tex., Laredo, 909 F.2d at 842 (quoting Dawn Donut Co.
v. Hart's Food Stores, 267 F.2d 358, 358 (2d Cir. 1959)). See supra notes 110-15 and
accompanying text.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2000).
118. § 1072.
119. See Dawn Donut Co., 267 F.2d at 363-65; see also Union Nat'l Bank, 909 F.2d
at 842 n.6 (discussing criticism of Dawn Donut). The constructive notice provision
was part of the original Lanham Act, which took effect in 1947, while the constructive
use provision was added in 1988.
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its mark and exclude late-comers only in its area of actual use (plus
natural zone of expansion, of course). When a junior user registers
the mark first (presumably innocently), its rights will be subject to
those of the senior user within the latter's "area [of] continuous
prior use," even after the registration has become incontestable. 1"0
The PTO is authorized to issue concurrent registrations where
concurrent use is unlikely to cause confusion, subject to
appropriate "conditions and limitations as to the mode or place of
use. "
121
Application of these principles to the Union National Bank
facts yields a range of combinations and permutations. Assume,
for example, that the relevant market is the entire nation. UNB-
Austin was the first to use the UNB mark somewhere in the
United States, as well as the first to register: UNB-Laredo should
have no rights, and UNB-Austin would apparently be entitled to
an injunction. If, however, the relevant market is Texas, then
UNB-Laredo was the first to make actual use of the mark in that
market, and could be characterized as an unregistered senior user.
But UNB-Austin's registration antedated UNB-Laredo's use, and
that registration created constructive nationwide use, as well as
notice. So is it then correct to say that UNB-Laredo had
appropriated a mark already in use everywhere, including Texas,
of which it had notice? If so, would UNB-Austin's rights to an
injunction be limited to its actual market-plus-zone-of-expansion?
Finally, what if each bank's market was determined to be entirely
local? Would each be a senior user in its own markets? Again,
however, how could such a finding be reconciled with the
nationwide constructive use and notice doctrines?
As the case disappeared from the record after the Fifth
Circuit's remand order, these questions remain unanswered. It is
difficult to see any set of answers that would adequately reconcile
the relevant provisions of trademark law, equity, and common
sense. The obvious lesson of the case is to register one's marks.
Had FNB-Laredo attempted to register, it presumably would have
encountered UNB-Austin's "Union National Bank of "mark.




This might have been a situation for the granting of concurrent
registrations with appropriate limitations on geographic use and,
perhaps, the details of the parties' respective names. In any event,
the result would have been to frame and, perhaps, clarify the issues
at an early stage.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
From a normative standpoint, it is clear that trademark law
has never offered any special accommodations to the banking
business, and shows no likelihood of doing so in the future. Nor
should it. Unlike patent and some aspects of copyright law, which
have developed highly technical and frequently unpredictable
doctrines, trademark decisions have consistently been based on
common-sense assessments of how consumer markets work.
Although new technologies have sometimes posed novel questions
(for example, whether use of someone else's trademark as an
Internet metatag is infringement), the framing of the analyses has
been remarkably consistent and the answers given tolerably
predictable over time and across industries. Neither banking's
economic and social significance nor its quirky history creates a
mandate for special treatment.
This means that banking must come to terms with
trademark law in its present state. As the case law we have
reviewed indicates, banking has seemingly ignored trademark law
for much of its history. There may have been understandable
reasons for this in the past, but those reasons are now irrelevant.
As bankers (and their lawyers) show increasing interest in making
aggressive "offensive" use of trademarks, they must do the work of
understanding how trademarks are established, strengthened, and
protected. With that in mind, we offer the following practical
thoughts:
"Registration" is to trademarks what "location" is to real
estate. Yet, as is evident from the cases, even large and
sophisticated banking companies continue to be sloppy in their
registration practices. The benefits are great; conversely, failure to
register invites a wide range of problems. The cost is minimal, so
minimal that we sometimes think that banks would prefer not to
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find out that a chosen trademark might be invalid. But is it not
better to learn that before spending money on a mark? So, first
and foremost, register.
Do not assume that a brand or a product line will
automatically enjoy trademark status. The mere fact that a brand
or line is successful does not make it a valid trademark.
"Trademark" has a precise definition that must be satisfied in
every instance.
Remember that the primary criterion for validity is that the
mark be distinctive. Many of the marks that have been litigated
seem to have been chosen in almost-willful ignorance of this most
fundamental of trademark principles. What is distinctive to a
banking insider may be descriptive or even generic to a judge or
juror. At a minimum, experienced trademark counsel should
participate in the choice of a new mark or the decision to defend
an existing one; in some cases, before-the-fact survey research may
be required.
Relatedly, do not make assumptions about what are and
are not confusingly similar marks. Bank litigants have repeatedly
found out that small differences between marks that seem material
to them are insignificant to the courts. Before investing in a mark
that may overlap with someone else's, seek trademark counsel
and, in especially close cases, conduct a preliminary survey.
Do not assume that insiders' understandings of the banking
market will be shared by the courts. The latter have appreciated
large-scale differences between commercial and consumer
banking, but subtler product market distinctions have often been
lost. As for the judicial response to geographic markets, expect
the unexpected. The issue itself has always been complicated in
trademark law, and it is especially difficult to predict results in a
rapidly changing business like banking.
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